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OCCUPATIONAL SAFETY AND HEALTH STANDARDS AS
FEDERAL LAW: THE HAZARDS OF HASTE
ROBERT D. MoRAN*
The Williams-Steiger Occupational Safety and Health Act of 19701
gave to the Secretary of Labor broad powers to develop and promul-
gate standards to protect the safety and health of workers throughout
the United States. The development and issuance of adequate job
safety standards within a relatively short period of time, while not
foreseen as a major problem area at the time of the Act's passage, has
proved very troublesome. The initial standards package promulgated
pursuant to the Act was, for the most part, adopted verbatim from two
sources: voluntary guidelines developed by private standards organi-
zations and job safety regulations authorized under earlier legislation.
Unfortunately standards from both sources have proven to be, many
times, entirely unrelated to the health and safety of workers. An exam-
ination of these standards reveals that they frequently are unenforceable
or othenvise inadequate to promote employee safety. Clearly, an urgent
need exists for the development of more meaningful standards if the
purposes of the Williams-Steiger Act are to be achieved.
DEVELOPMENT OF THE PRESENT ST DARDS
It is doubtful that Congress has ever enacted a broader grant of
lawmaking authority to any officer of the executive branch than that
delegated to the Secretary of Labor in the following provision of the
Villiams-Steiger Act: "The Secretary may by rule promulgate, modify,
or revoke any occupational safety or health standard... [W]henever...
[he] ... determines that a rule should be promulgated in order to serve
the objectives of this chapter ....,2 The last part of this grant hardly
limits the Secretary's discretion, for the objectives of the Act include
"developing innovative methods, techniques, and approaches for dealing
with occupational safety and health problems." ' Moreover, the stand-
ards which the Secretary is authorized to promulgate are not innocuous
*BA., University of Maine; J.D., Boston University. Chairman, United States Occu-
pational Safety and Health Review Commission.
1. 29 U.S.C. §§ 651-78 (1970).
2. Id. § 655(b).
3. Id. § 651 (b) (5).
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or precatory guidelines. The Act requires that every employer engaged
in a business affecting commerce4 "shall comply with occupational safety
and health standards promulgated under this chapter";" violators are
subject to severe penalties.
It is difficult to conceive of anything that does not affect the safety
and health of working people; the hours he works, his diet, his state
of mind as he leaves for the job each day, and even his sex life con-
ceivably can affect the mental health of a worker while on the job.
Some innovative future Secretary of Labor who fancied himself a
benevolent incarnation of the "Big Brother" of George Orwell's 1984
could approach that status merely by using the existing authority for
job safety regulation. Perhaps the single constraint lies in the Act's
definition of an "occupational safety and health standard" as "a standard
which requires conditions, or the adoption or use of one or more prac-
tices, means, methods, operations, or processes, reasonably necessary or
appropriate to provide safe or healthful employment and places of em-
ployment." By thus providing a reasonableness requirement, Congress
retained an opportunity for judicial review8 which may limit the Secre-
tary's discretion to some extent.9
The Secretary's extensive power to promulgate standards was exer-
cised almost immediately following passage 'of the Act through the
adoption of regulations previously developed by government agencies
and private organizations. These hurriedly promulgated standards gen-
4. The Act applies to employers engaged in business affecting commerce throughout
the United States but excludes federal and state agencies. Id. §§ 652 (3), 653 (a), (b) (1).
See generally Moran, The Impact of the Job Safety Act, 6 GA. L. REv. 489, 493-94
(1972).
5. 29 U.S.C. § 654(a) (2) (1970).
6. Maximum penalties for noncompliance are $1,000 for an ordinary violation,$10,000 for a willful or repeated violation, and $1,000 for each day a previously estab-
lished violation goes uncorrected. Willful violations resulting in death to any em-
ployee render the employer potentially subject to criminal fines of S10,000, six months in
prison, or both. Id. § 666.
7. Id. § 652(8) (emphasis supplied).
8. Citations of violations of standards, rules, and orders under the Act are issued by
the Secretary of Labor. Id. § 658(a). Such citations, if contested, are adjudicated by the
Occupational Safety and Health Review Commission. Id. § 659(c). Any party adversely
affected or aggrieved by an order of the Commission may obtain review of that order
in the court of appeals for the circuit in which the violation is alleged to have occurred,
or in the Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit. The Commission's
findings of fact, if supported by substantial evidence, are conclusive, although the court
of appeals may grant leave to introduce new evidence. Id. § 660.
9. The recent decision of the Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit in Associated
Indus. of N.Y. State, Inc. v. United States Dep't of Labor, 487 F.2d 342 (2d Cir.
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erally have been ineffective in enabling employers to identify and
eliminate hazards to their employees, and proper enforcement has been
hampered by problems of interpretation. Drafting sufficient job safety
guidelines does not appear to be an onerous task; verbatim adoption
of standards drawn by others, however, without careful consideration
of the purpose to be served, has proved unsatisfactory as an examina-
tion of these standards and their historical development will amply
indicate.
Standards for worker safety had been in existence for many years
before the Williams-Steiger Act 0 became law. Accident-prevention and
disease-avoidance techniques have a history as long as human existence.
Hippocrates, the father of medicine, recognized the effects of work on
health more than 400 years before Christ, and the German physician
Ellenborg over 500 years ago described the damage which may be
sustained from worlng with coal, nitric acid, lead, mercury, and various
metallic fumes. Nevertheless, although individual employers and em-
ployees have always attempted to guard their safety and health from
hazards, the process of formulating, formalizing, and testing the effec-
tiveness of safety methods and techniques and of applying them to more
than one industrial establishment seems to have begun only slightly
more than a century ago. One of the first known sets of job safety
1973), suggests the potential role of the courts. Viewing with disfavor the Secretary's
determination of the minimum number of lavatories required for industrial establish-
ments, Judge Friendly, writing for the court, observed: "[WIhen the Department
imposes a standard considerably more stringent than that which apparently has been
found satisfactory by many states with a long history of protection to industrial
workers, and particularly when it does so over explicit objections grounded on that
history, then it has an obligation to produce some evidence justifying its action." Id.
at 352-53. This was one of the first indications that the discretion of the Secretary of
Labor was not absolute in deciding what conditions or practices would best promote
job safety and health.
10. Under the Act, employers are required generally to maintain places of employ-
ment free of recognized hazards likely to cause death or serious harm; in addition, they
must comply with specific standards promulgated by the Secretary of Labor pursuant
to the Act. 29 U.S.C. § 654(a) (1970). The Secretary is empowered to promulgate
occupational safety or health standards based on any established federal standard or
national consensus standard without regard to Administrative Procedure Act require-
ments during the first two years following the effective date of the Act. Id. § 655(a).
Additional standards, or modifications of existing standards, may be promulgated by the
Secretary upon the basis of information available to him or submitted to him by an in-
terested person, a representative of an organization of employees or employers, a nation-
ally recognized standards producing organization, the Secretary of Health, Education and
Welfare, the National Institute for Occupational Safety and Health, or a state or
political subdivision. The Secretary may request the aid of an advisory committee in
the formulation of such standards. Id. § 655(b) (1).
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standards was developed at an 1869 meeting of the heads of mechanical
engineering departments of various independent railroads and adopted
in 1893 in a standards code for all railroads. Other private associations
subsequently were formed to develop and coordinate safety standards,
and a number of states enacted legislation designed to reduce or protect
against occupational hazards. Fifty to a hundred years of experience
with the development, issuance, and observance of safety standards is
thus available for guidance in drafting safety and health standards under
the Williams-Steiger Act.
Transposing this accumulated experience into the 1970 law, however,
poses difficulties. The former standards were not binding, not en-
forced, and not written in terms amenable to enforcement. Nor were
they concerned exclusively with worker safety; standards encompassing
the safety of workers, equipment, buildings, the general public, and
consumers frequently were intertwined. These standards, in addition,
were not applicable to industry as a whole or, in many cases, even to a
single segment of an industry. Finally, standards adopted by various
organizations and states often were inconsistent or conflicting" and
included language lacking the specificity necessary for comprehension
by the ordinary businessman or employee.
These difficulties of transposition, nevertheless, appear to have been
ignored in the initial flurry of activity under the Williams-Steiger Act,
for hundreds of regulations were adopted for enforcement by the
Occupational Safety and Health Administration (OSHA)12 without
change from preexisting standards. The result has been inefficiency in
enhancing job safety and health. Many of the standards which now
have the force of law not only fail to guide interested employers in
their attempts to improve job safety but also lack the specificity neces-
sary for fair and adequate enforcement; indeed, they often are so
vague as to suggest conflict with requirements 'of due process.
The Act provided that the Secretary could promulgate a preexisting
standard as an "occupational safety and health standard" without pur-
11. See, e.g., Associated Indus. of N.Y. State, Inc. v. United States Dep't of Labor,
487 F.2d 342 (2d Cir. 1973). At issue was a standard relating to the number of
lavatories required in places of employment. See note 9 supra. The promulgated
standards were based upon the codes of five states, those of the American National
Standards Institute and the Building Officials and Code Administrators, as well as the
National Plumbing Code. Twelve conflicting state codes were cited by petitioner. Id.
at 352.
12. The Secretary of Labor has delegated much of his authority under the ,Villiams-
Steiger Act to this agency of the Department of Labor.
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suing formal rulemaking procedures 13 if he found that it was a
"national consensus standard" which:
(1) has been adopted and promulgated by a nationally recognized
standards-producing organization under procedures whereby it
can be determined by the Secretary that persons interested and
affected by the scope or provisions of the standard have reached
substantial agreement on its adoption, (2) was formulated in a
manner which afforded an opportunity for diverse views to be
considered and (3) has been designated as such a standard by the
Secretary, after consultation with other appropriate Federal agen-
cies.14
In addition, the Secretary was given authority to adopt, without fol-
lowing formal rulemaking procedures, any "established Federal stand-
ard," a term the Act defines as "any operative occupational safety and
health standard established by any agency of the United States and
presently in effect, or contained in any Act of Congress in force on
December 29, 1970." 1
Although minimal concern was expressed in Congress about the De-
partment of Labor's ability to develop reasonable standards within the
initial tvo-year period during which formal rulemaking procedures
were not required, 1 almost all legislators taking an active part in
writing the law, despite other differences,17 anticipated that the immedi-
ate standards would comprise "national consensus" and "established Fed-
eral" standards.' The Senate Committee on Labor and Public Welfare
noted that these twvo sources would be used to "establish as rapidly as
possible national occupational safety and health standards with which
13. 29 U.S.C. § 655 (a) (1970). See note 28 infra.
14. Id. § 652(9).
15. Id. § 652 (10).
16. "How in the world are they [the Department of Labor] going to find time
within the required 2 years to set forth reasonable standards for health and safety.. .
116 CoNG. REc. 37343 (1970) (remarks of Senator Dominick).
17. There was a marked difference of opinion in Congress over whether the power
to promulgate standards was to be given to a board of experts or to the Secretary of
Labor. See Gross, The Occupational Safety and Health Act: Much Ado About Some-
thing, 3 LoYoLA U.L.J. 247 (1972).
18. Three occupational safety and health bills were submitted to the Senate during
the 91st Congress: S. 2193, by Senator Harrison A. Williams, Jr.; S. 2788, by Senator
Jacob K. Javits; and S. 4404, by Senator Peter H. Dominick. All three Senate bills
and all of the House bills (H.R. 843, H.R. 3809, H.R. 13373, H.R. 16785, H.R. 19200)
except H.R. 4294 had some provision for adopting standards of these types.
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industry is familiar."'" It would be "appropriate," the Committee
continued, for such standards to be adopted by the Secretary of Labor
"without regard to the provisions of the Administrative Procedure
Act." 20
In the House of Representatives, members were similarly sanguine
about using national consensus and existing federal standards. Repre-
sentative William Scherle of Iowa, for example, spoke in favor of the
approach, quoting President Nixon's message to Congress in support
of job safety and health legislation: "Maximum use will be made of
standards established through a voluntary consensus of industry, labor,
and other experts."21 This attitude was reflected in similar statements
by other Congressmen.22
In short, although most members of Congress foresaw major difficul-
ties with various aspects of enforcement,23 imminent danger proce-
19. S. RE. No. 1282, 91st Cong, 2d Sess. 6 (1970). Although industrial leaders now
dispute the appropriateness of the phrase "with which industry is familiar," they gave
no hint at the time the Act was being considered that they did not already live by
the consensus standards.
20. Id. The relevant section of the Administrative Procedure Act provides for
hearings for submission and consideration of facts by interested parties. 5 U.S.C. 5 554
(1970). This procedure was viewed as unnecessary in the case of existing federal
standards because they had "already been subjected to the procedural scrutiny man-
dated by the law under which they were issued; such standards, moreover, in large
part, represent the incorporation of voluntary industrial standards." S. RE'. No. 1282,
91st Cong., 2d Sess. 6 (1970). Subsequent experience has cast doubt upon the accuracy
of this assertion. See notes 73-82 infra & accompanying text. The national consensus
standards also were viewed as relating to the "traditional practice in the industry."
116 CONG. Rtc. 37327 (1970) (remarks of Senator Javits). These standards would be
those developed primarily by organizations such as the American National Standards
Institute. See 116 CONG. REc. 37623 (1970) (remarks of Senator Javits). Through these
sources "the Secretary [of Labor] would utilize and build upon the work already
done by private industry and Government in the formulation of standards . . . ." 116
CoNG. REc. 41762 (1970) (remarks of Senator Williams, co-author of the bill which
eventually was enacted).
21. 116 CoNG. Rac. 42208 (1970).
22. Wisconsin Representative William Steiger, co-author of the Act, for example,
observed:
Because such standards have already been scrutinized either through the
consensus-method or through procedures provided under Federal law, the
[Steiger-Sikes] substitute bill requires no hearings or other APA procedures
for promulgating them under the new act; they simply become effective
upon publication in the Federal Register. The national consensus standards
would remain in effect until superseded by permanent standards as replace-
ments.
116 CoNG. REc. 38373 (1970). The Steiger-Sikes substitute bill, H.R. 19200, 91st Cong., 2d
Sess. (1970), was the bill eventually adopted by the House.
23. The Secretary of Labor is empowered to inspect places of employment and
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dures,2 4 adjudication,-" and the imprecision of the employer's "general
duty" to provide safe and healthful workplaces,26 few anticipated prob-
lems arising from the adoption of existing federal and national consensus
standards as enforceable job safety regulations.27 Thus, with little dis-
cussion and apparently little actual knowledge of what might be hauled
up in the net, the Secretary of Labor was given authority to promulgate
as occupational safety and health standards "any national consensus
standard, and any established Federal standard."' 2  Although section
6 (a) of the Act allowed the Secretary two years 9 from the Act's effec-
tive date3° to promulgate such standards without following the formal
rulemaking procedures required by the APA and section 6(b) of the
Act,3 ' a package of "occupational safety and health standards" was pub-
conduct investigations. 29 U.S.C. § 657 (1970). If violations are cited, the Secretary
is required to inform the employer of the penalty assessed for each violation. The
employer may, within 15 days, notify the Secretary that he intends to contest the citation
before the Occupational Safety and Health Review Commission. Id. § 659. See generally
Moran, supra note 4, at 499-501; Comment, The Occupational Safety and Health Act of
1970, 34 LA. L. REv. 102, 111-12 (1973).
24. Emergency temporary standards may be promulgated without regard to the
requirements of the Administrative Procedure Act where grave danger to employees
exists and emergency standards are necessary to protect employees from such danger.
29 U.S.C. 5 655(c) (1970). See generally Moran, supra note 4, at 496-97.
25. Adjudication under the Act is by the Occupational Safety and Health Review
Commission, composed of three members appointed by the President. 29 US.C.
§ 659(c), 661 (1970). Hearings are conducted by review examiners appointed by the
Commission; the report of the hearing examiner becomes the final order unless a
Commission member directs review within 30 days. Id. § 661(i). See generally Com-
ment, The Occupational Safety and Health Act of 1970, 34 LA. L. REv. 102, 112 (1973).
26. Each employer is required to "furnish to each of his employees employment and
a place of employment which are free from recognized hazards that are causing or are
likely to cause death or serious physical harm to his employees . . . ." 29 U.S.C.
§ 654(a) (1) (1970). See generally Moran, supra note 4, at 494; Comment, The Occupa-
tional Safety and Health Act of 1970, 34 LA. L. Rv. 102, 102-03 (1973).
27. Only Senator William B. Saxbe of Ohio seemed to have the slightest inkling that
such an approach might carry certain concomitant difficulties: "[Wie are going to
have to accept these consensus standards . . . wholesale, to start with, because we will
not have the real opportunity to... start from scratch." 116 CoNG. REc. 36537 (1970)
(emphasis supplied).
28. 29 U.S.C. § 655(a) (1970) provides: "[Tlhe Secretary shall, as soon as practicable
during the period beginning with the effective date of this chapter and ending two
years after such date, by rule promulgate as an occupational safety or health standard
any national consensus standard, and any established Federal standard, unless he deter-
mines that the promulgation of such a standard would not result in improved safety
or health for specifically designated employees."
29. Id.
30. The Act became effective April 28, 1971, 120 days after its enactment De-
cember 29, 1970.
31. 29 U.S.C. § 655(b) (1970).
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lished on May 29, 1971, only a month and a day after the effective
date22 This package consisted merely of a verbatim selection of stand-
ards from the two permissible sources.
This seemingly enormous task had been accomplished with surprising
speed. Since the first of three parts covered about 300 pages of the
Federal Register, it was some time before it was known generally that
the standards included such matters as a ban on the use of ice in drinking
water3 3 and a requirement that workplace toilets be equipped with split
seats.14 This realization led to questioning of the supposed sanctity of
job safety standards and to recognition that reappraisal of their capacity
to fulfill their avowed purpose was in order.
There seems to be little dispute that a standard is developed and
promulgated because of the existence or potential existence of a condi-
tion hazardous to the safety or health of workers. The purpose of stand-
ards presumably is to inform employers what must be done to eliminate,
reduce, or prevent hazardous conditions. Experience has shown, for
example, that it is dangerous to work as a painter on the Golden Gate
Bridge; a fall of several hundred feet from the bridge would lead to
almost certain death. This hazard could be reduced if a net capable of
catching falling workers were strung under the bridge or if painters
were required to wear safety belts hitched so that a fall from the bridge
would not end in the depths of San Francisco Bay. Writing a safety
standard establishing these requirements would not seem to pose any
insurmountable problem.
Two basic ingredients essential to every meaningful job safety and
health standard thus are identification of the hazard and specification of
what must be done to eliminate it. All standards should include these
two fundamentals in understandable language so that employers will
know how to comply with the law and thereby protect employees from
occupational hazards. Traditional enforcement techniques, by which
safety inspectors find and punish violators and enforce abatement of
32. 36 Fed. Reg. 10466-10714 (1971). There was a 90-day moratorium on the effec-
tiveness of these standards to permit those employers not previously covered under
other laws to attempt to gain some familiarity with them. Thus, the effective date of
the regulations was August 27, 1971. COMMERCE CLEARiNG HousE, GumEBOOIC TO
OccurpAnoNAL SAF'=rv AND HEALT 37 (1973).
33. 29 C.F.R. § 1910.141(b) (1) (iii) (1972). This standard subsequently was revised
to permit ice, as long as it is made from potable water, to come into contact with
drinking water. 38 Fed. Reg. 10932 (1973).
34. 29 C.F.R. S 1910.141(c) (3) (ii) (1972). This standard subsequently was revised
to require only seats installed or replaced after June 4, 1973, to be "open-front." 38
Fed. Reg. 10933 (1973).
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unsafe conditions, cannot guarantee attainment of the legislative purpose,
as there are less than 1,000 safety inspectors available to police approxi-
mately 5 million workplaces subject to regulation. Substandard working
conditions can be effectively eliminated only by self-instructive stand-
ards explicitly defining the employers' obligations. An inspection of
some national consensus and established federal standards nevertheless
reveals their inadequacies in providing the basic identification and speci-
fication ingredients.
NATIONAL CONSENSUS STANDARDS FROM ANSI
The American National Standards Institute (ANSI) was established
in 1918 as the American Engineering Standards Committee. The organi-
zation expanded and changed its name to the American Standards As-
sociation in 1928; the name was again changed in 1966 to the United
States of America Standards Institute and in 1969 to the present title.
ANSI is a private body which "itself does not write standards... [but]
makes use of the combined technical talent and expertise of its organi-
zational members, technical, professional and trade associations, as well
as the companies and industrial firms that comprise the federation."'
According to its managing director, it is "the major clearinghouse and
coordinating agency for voluntary standardization in the United
States." 37
Of nearly 5,000 American National Standards only some 120 osten-
sibly deal with job safety and health.38 The remainder are concerned
with such matters as the size of screw threads and bolts, the consistency
and performance of portland cement, data processing practices, and the
shape of electrical plugs and receptacles.39 ANSI coordinates the devel-
opment of standards primarily through two procedures4 ° designed to
ensure a diversity of input and to conform with the following principle:
[A] consensus must be reached of those having substantial concern
with [a standard's] scope and provisions. In standardization prac-
tice a consensus is achieved when substantial agreement is reached
by concerned interests according to the judgment of a duly ap-
35. American National Standards Institute, Guide for the Development of American
National Standards 3 (Nov. 2, 1972) [hereinafter cited as ANSI Guide].
36. Id.
37. Peyton, ANSI: Consensus Agency for Voluntary Standards, DFars MANAGE-
MENT J., April 1973, at 41 (emphasis supplied).
38. Id. at 43-44. Those standards dealing with job safety and health have been
referenced for use by the Occupational Safety and Health Administration. Id. at 44.
39. Id. at 43.
40. The first procedure, the canvass method, involves the submission of a proposed
19741
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pointed authority. Consensus implies much more than the con-
cept of a simple majority but not necessarily unanimity.41
The consensus method employed in the development of ANSI stand-
ards almost necessarily resulted in the promulgation of some vague and
ambiguous, as well as a number of purely advisory, standards. More-
over, the voluntary nature of ANSI standards often resulted in their
idealization. Donald Peyton, ANSI's managing director, has commented:
"In the days before OSHA, when standards were developed as ad-
visories, not laws, the committees sometimes tended to incorporate some
lofty goals, knowing they would never be held accountable if they
didn't achieve them."42
Nevertheless, OSHA embraced these ANSI standards, including their
strengths as well as weaknesses. Usually the standards were adopted
verbatim, although many "grandfather clauses" exempting existing
equipment and structures were deleted. Direct incorporation of ANSI
standards led to OSHA enforcement of such standards as one dealing
with floor loading protection which requires:
In every building or other structure, or part thereof, used for
mercantile, business, industrial, or storage purposes, the loads ap-
proved by the building official shall be marked on plates of ap-
proved design which shall be supplied and securely affixed by the
owner of the building, or his duly authorized agent, in a con-
spicuous place in each space to which they relate.43
In promulgating this standard, OSHA was completely faithful to the
source: it is a national consensus ANSI floor load marking standard,
standard by an interested group to a vote of knowledgeable individuals and organiza-
tions. The voter list must be approved for comprehensiveness by ANSI, and the
completed standard and voting results are also reviewed by that organization. Id. at
42-43. The other principal method used to develop standards is the committee method,
whereby representatives of affected groups are chosen to form a committee, with an
interested organization as secretariat. This committee develops the standard, which
again must be reviewed by ANSI. Id. at 43. See also ANSI Guide, supra note 35,
at 29.
41. ANSI Guide, supra note 35, at 6.
42. Musacchio, The Poower Press Flap: Will It Reshape Standards Setting?, OcIwA-
TIoNAL HAZARDs, October 1973, at 108.
43. 29 C.F.R. § 1910.22(d) (1) (1973) (emphasis supplied).
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word-for-word.44 And that is the problem; the standard imposes a duty
on building owners and their agents, not on employers.45
In at least one instance, OSHA attempted to enforce this standard
against an employer who merely leased a textile mill in which the
required floor load plates were not provided," proposing a $45 civil
penalty for the alleged violation.47  The employer, who was neither
the owner of the building nor agent for the owner, promptly contested
the enforcement action. Although an administrative law judge s found
the employer in violation of the standard, discretionary review by the
Occupational Safety and Health Review Commission49 resulted in
unanimous reversal. The Commission noted that "[s]ince the standard,
by its terms, imposes a duty on an owner or his agent, compliance by
this respondent was not required." 50
The floor load marldng standard is only one of many which by their
terms either impose no duty on employers as such or impose a duty
so vague as to be unenforceable. An example of the latter is found in
an OSHA sawmill standard governing operations around mechanical
tree barkers. Taken verbatim from an ANSI safety requirement for
sawmills,51 the standard requires that the "hazardous area around ring
barkers and their conveyors shall be fenced off or posted as a prohibited
area for unauthorized persons." 52 "Hazardous area" and "unauthorized
persons" are not defined. Furthermore, the Williams-Steiger Act, of
course, was not intended to protect "unauthorized persons," whoever
44. ANSI Standard A58.3.6-1972.
45. Under the Act, citations may be issued "[i]f, upon inspection or investigation,
the Secretary ... believes that an employer has violated a requirement ... of any
standard ... " 29 U.S.C. § 658(a) (1970) (emphasis supplied).
46. Secretary v. Frankford Woolen Mills, Inc., OSAHRC Docket No. 961 (June 13,
1973). OSAHRC refers to the Occupational Safety and Health Review Commission,
an independent tribunal established to adjudicate contested enforcement actions. 29
U.S.C. §§ 659(c), 661 (1970). See note 49 infra.
47. See note 6 supra.
48. See 29 U.S.C. § 661(i) (1970). Although the presiding officer at Commission
hearings is termed "hearing examiner" in the Act, the proper (and official) title is
"administrative law judge." 5 C.F.R. § 930.203a (1973).
49. The three-member Commission was established by 29 U.S.C. § 661 (a) (1970).
The report of an administrative law judge becomes final 30 days after it is sub-
mitted to the Commission unless a Commission member directs that it be reviewed.
Id. § 661 (i).
50. OSAHRC Docket No. 961, at 2.
51. ANSI Standard 02.4.4.3-1969.
52. 29 C.F.R. S 1910.265(d) (4) (iii) (1973).
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they may be 3 and however laudable it may be to shield them from
nebulous "hazardous areas."
This standard was challenged in Secretary v. Alloser Lumber Co., in
which OSHA's own inspector admitted that he could only "guess" that
"unauthorized persons" meant visitors to the mill and other persons not
charged with operation of the mechanical barkers." He was similarly
uncertain about the extent of the "hazardous area" around the machine,
suggesting that it could vary depending upon how far the machine
might throw rocks, pieces of wood, or other debris5 6 Uncertainty in
the inspector's attempt to explain the standard was not a result of igno-
rance or inexperience; his difficulty arose from the imprecision of the
terms of the standard. If precise application of the standard was difficult
for the inspector, could an employer be expected to be any more suc-
cessful in achieving compliance?
Although only a handful of cases under the Act have been decided by
appellate courts,57 the Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit has already
commented on the imprecision of OSHA standards: "The difficulty in
the present case arises from the use in regulation 1926.105 (a) of the
imprecise term 'impractical' . . . . The term ... is simply not precise
enough .... The fault lies in the wording of the regulation." r1 To
permit enforcement of standards worded in vague and imprecise terms,
even though they meet the "national consensus" procedural test for
adoption, not only subjects the employer to discretionary determina-
tion of compliance by OSHA inspectors but also gives rise to possible
conflict with the fair warning requirements of constitutional due proc-
ess.;9 Employer compliance with a standard should not depend upon
53. See 29 U.S.C. § 654(a) (1) (1970): 'Each employer . . .shall furnish to each of
his employees [a hazard-free place to work]" (emphasis supplied).
54. OSAHRC Docket No. 1221 (Aug. 10, 1973).
55. Id. at 18.
56. Id.
57. E.g., Frank Irey, Jr., Inc. v. Hodgson, 409 U.S. 1070 (1972); Brennan v. OSAHRC,
481 F.2d 619 (5th Cir. 1973); Spangler v. Kranco, Inc., 481 F.2d 373 (4th Cir. 1973);
Skidmore v. Travelers Ins. Co., 356 F. Supp. 670 (D. La.), aff'd, 483 F.2d 67 (5th Cir.
1973).
58. Brennan v. OSAHRC, 488 F.2d 337, 338-39 (5th Cir. 1973).
59. The fair warning requirement, applicable to both state and federal action, is part
of the due process guarantees of the fifth and fourteenth amendments to the United
States Constitution. Cramp v. Board of Public Instr., 368 U.S. 278 (1961) (Florida loyalty
oath); United States v. Cardiff, 344 U.S. 174 (1952) (section 301 (f) of the Federal Food
Drug and Cosmetic Act). The aspect of the fair warning requirement pertinent to the
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the idiosyncratic interpretation of the standard by an inspector. Natu-
rally, the inspector's interpretation will not be made known to the
employer until a violation is cited; even then, the employer will not
be able to predict the requirements that will accompany the next
inspector's interpretation of the standard.
The Moser Lumber case discussed above was subsequently dismissed
by the administrative law judge who originally heard the case. In dis-
missing the action, he noted: "[Tlhe Compliance Officer and the Re-
spondent must guess as to the application of the standard. When the
language of a standard is open to different interpretations; it is un-
enforceably vague. A standard is promulgated for the purpose of telling
employers what they must do to avoid a workplace hazard." 60 The
sawmill standard challenged in Moser Lumber had been through the
consensus procedures of the American National Standards Institute and
had been accepted by most of the persons affected by it. There was
nothing wrong with it as an ANSI sawmill standard, as there is little
doubt that "unauthorized persons" should be kept away from mechanical
present discussion involves the doctrine of unconstitutional uncertainty or vagueness,
summarized in Cramp:
We think this case demonstrably falls within the compass of those decisions
of the Court which hold that "... . a statute which either forbids or requires
the doing of an act in terms so vague that men of common intelligence must
necessarily guess at its meaning and differ as to its application violates the
first essential of due process of law." . .. ".No one may be required at
peril of life, liberty or property to speculate as to the meaning of penal
statutes. All are entitled to be informed as to what the State commands or
forbids."
368 U.S. at 287. "The underlying principle is that no man shall be held criminally
responsible for conduct which he could not reasonably understand to be proscribed."
United States v. Harriss, 347 U.S. 612, 617 (1954). For a thorough discussion of the
problems of vagueness, see Collings, Unconstitutional Uncertainty-An Appraisal, 40
CoRN =- L.Q. 195 (1955).
Courts have employed various paths of reasoning to avoid finding a law or regulation
unconstitutionally uncertain. In Boyce Motor Lines, Inc. v. United States, 342 U.S.
337 (1952), for example, an Interstate Commerce Commission regulation prohibiting
transportation of explosives through congested areas if a practical alternative route is
available was upheld despite a claim of unenforceability due to vagueness. The Court
stated: "The statute punishes only those who knowingly violate the Regulation. This
requirement of the presence of culpable intent as a necessary element of the offense
does much to destroy any force in the argument that application of the Regulation
would be so unfair that it must be held invalid." 342 U.S. at 342. For discussion of
this and other rationales used to avoid applying the vagueness doctrine to strike down
laws or regulations, see Collings, supra, at 223.
60. OSAHRC Docket No. 1221, at 19.
WILLIAM AND MARY LAW REVIEW [Vol. 15:777
barkers. The error was in its unthinking adoption as a job safety stand-
ard and the OSHA attempt to enforce it as such.
It can be suspected that literally hundreds of such "national con-
sensus" standards, vague and useless for protecting employees, were
promulgated during the OSHA "start-up" period.6' The undiscrimi-
nating adoption of these standards was due, no doubt, to the near sanctifi-
cation Congress bestowed upon national consensus standards in enacting
the law. 2 The unfortunate result, however, has been that the hazards to
be avoided are often not mentioned in the OSHA standards or are
submerged in vague terminology; in addition, curative procedures are
not precisely articulated.63 The unenforceability of many of the stand-
ards" clearly indicates their inadequacy as sources of job safety guide-
lines for concerned employers.
Adoption of national consensus standards by the Labor Department
has also produced problems arising from the advisory nature of many
of these originally voluntary standards. ANSI emphasized the distinc-
tion between advisory and mandatory requirements of the various
standards developed under its auspices. The ANSI standard for over-
head and gantry cranes, 5 for example, contains the following language:
61. One of the 15 standards most frequently cited by safety inspectors involves
walking-working surfaces and, more particularly, housekeeping. To Prevent Costly
Slips and Falls-Focus on Floor Safety, OccUPATIoNAL HAzARars, November 1973, at 37.
Taken word-for-word from ANSI Standard 24.3.1.1-1968, this regulation requires that
"[a]ll places of employment, passageways, storerooms, and service rooms shall be
kept clean and orderly and in a sanitary condition." 29 C.F.R. § 1910.22(a) (1973).
These are concepts with which everyone is familiar, yet everyone is also aware that
what one person will call "clean" another will call "filthy." "Orderly" may mean
quite different things to one's mother, first sergeant, and college roommate. Despite
this indefiniteness, an employer was cited for violation of this standard in Secretary v.
Utah-Idaho Sugar Co, OSAHRC Docket No. 764 (Sept. 27, 1973).
62. There is, in fact, some question whether some of the national consensus standards
satisfy the following definition of the term "occupational safety and health standard"
in 29 U.S.C. § 652(8) (1970): "[A] standard which requires conditions, or the adop-
tion or use of the one or more practices, means, methods, operations, or processes,
reasonably necessary or appropriate to provide safe or healthful employment and
places of employment.'
63. For example, a standard for overhead crane hooks, taken verbatim from ANSI
Standard B30.2-1.10.4-1967, requires that "[h]ooks shall meet the manufacturer's recom-
mendations and shall not be overloaded." 29 C.F.R. § 1910.179(h)(4) (1973). An em-
ployer can only guess what he must do to comply with this regulation; the hazard
to be eliminated is equally speculative.
64. Due to its vagueness, the crane hook standard discussed in note 63 supra has
been held unenforceable. Secretary v. Utah-Idaho Sugar Co., OSAHRC Docket No. 764,
at 35 (Sept. 27, 1973).
65. ANSI Standard B30.2.0-1967.
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"Mandatory rules of this Code are characterized by the use of the word
'shall.' If a rule is of an advisory nature it is indicated by use of the
word 'should' or is stated as a recommendation." 6' A provision in the
ANSI standard recommending bridge bumpers provides: "A crane
should be provided with bumpers capable of stopping the crane.., at a
rate of deceleration not to exceed 3 feet per second when traveling in
either direction at 20 percent of the rated load speed.... " 67 When
OSHA promulgated this standard as an occupational safety and health
standard,"' the word "should" was changed to "shall," although the
remainder of the standard was not altered. With this change, however,
the bumpers standard no longer met the definition of a "national con-
sensus standard" in the Act, which specifies that such a standard is one
which "has been adopted and promulgated by a nationally recognized
standards-producing organization under procedures whereby it can be
determined by the Secretary that persons interested and affected by the
scope or provisions of the standard have reached substantial agreement
on its adoption, [and] was formulated in a manner which afforded an
opportunity for diverse views to be considered... .'"' Clearly, the
ANSI subcommittee which wrote the original standard had not reached
"substantial agreement" on the standard as promulgated by OSHA since
it agreed only upon an advisory standard recommending bridge bumpers.
The mandatory language in the OSHA standard represented such a
major variation from the original ANSI standard that the presiding judge
in Secretary v. Oberhelman-Ritter Foundry, Inc.70 ruled that the OSHA
standard was invalid, noting that the desired alteration, to be valid,
should have been executed pursuant to the rather elaborate procedures
under the Act7' for modification of standards.7 2
The careless adoption of national consensus standards has undoubtedly
66. ANSI Standard B30.2.0-1967 (Section V).
67. ANSI Standard B30.2-1.7.2 (emphasis supplied).
68. 29 C.F.R. § 1910.179(e) (2) (i) (1972).
69. 29 U.S.C. § 652(9) (1970).
70. OSAHRC Docket No. 1572 (July 31, 1973).
71. 29 US.C. §§ 655(b) (2)-(4) (1970) require the Secretary to publish any proposed
rule in the Federal Register. Any interested person may present written data or
comments within 30 days, with the option of requesting a public hearing. Within
30 days of the period for presenting such objections, the Secretary is to publish
the standard to which objection has been made and to set the time and place for
hearing. Thereafter, the standard is to be published in the Federal Register, with an
effective date which provides affected employers and employees sufficient opportunity
to familiarize themselves with its terms.
72. OSAHRC Docket No. 1572, at 9-10.
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weakened the beneficial effects of the Act. Enforcement has been hin-
dered, and the standards have failed to inform employers of their statutory
duties. It is also unfortunate that problems of equal or greater pro-
portion have plagued the use of established federal standards promulgated
in a similarly heedless manner.
ESTABLISHED FEDERAL STANDARDS FROM THE WALSH-HEALEY AcT
A rather large block of the initial package of standards issued by the
Secretary of Labor was adopted from standards issued by the
Walsh-Healey Act of 1936 .7  As with national consensus standards,
many of these "established Federal standards" 74 were promulgated pur-
suant to section 6(a) of the Williams-Steiger Act verbatim as OSHA
standards. 75
The Walsh-Healey standards had been established in accordance with
the formal rulemaking provisions of the Administrative Procedure Act
(APA), 7 which requires publication of proposed rules in the Federal
Register to provide notice and the opportunity for comment by inter-
ested persons prior to the time they become effective.77 Thus, in theory,
the Walsh-Healey safety and health standards had been scrutinized and
discussed by those affected by them. In reality, however, the vast ma-
jority of employers were unaware of the existence of Walsh-Healey
standards or of the Walsh-Healey Act itself, it being applicable only to
those firms who were contractors with the federal government for the
"manufacture or furnishing of materials, supplies, articles and equipment
in any amount exceeding $10,000 .... ,,7
73. 41 U.S.C. § 35-45 (1970). The Walsh-Healey Act prohibits federal purchase
of items manufactured under "unsanitary or hazardous" working conditions, rather than
forbidding the conditions themselves. It was not until 1960 that safety and health
standards were promulgated pursuant to the Act.
74. Other sources of "established Federal standards" included the Contract Work
Hours and Safety Standards Act, 40 U.S.C. §5 327-33 (1970); the Service Contract Act
of 1965, 41 U.S.C. §§ 351-58 (1970); the Longshoremen's & Harbor Workers' Com-
pensation Act, 33 U.S.C. §5 901-45, 947-50 (1970); and the National Foundation on the
Arts & Humanities Act of 1965, 20 US.C. §5 951-63 (1970).
75. 29 U.S.C. 5 655(a) (1970).
76. 5 U.S.C. § 553(b) (1970) provides that general notice of proposed rulemaking
be published in the Federal Register, unless persons to be subjected to the rule have
been personally served with or have actual notice.
77. 5 US.C. § 553(c) (1970) provides that "[alfter notice required by this section,
the agency shall give interested parties an opportunity to participate in the rule
making through submission of written data, views, or arguments with or without oppor-
tunity for oral presentation."
78. 41 U.S.C. § 35 (1970).
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Moreover, it is quite likely that the relatively limited enforcement
effort under the Walsh-Healey Act served to lull even the limited
number of employers subject to its coverage into a lack of concern with
the content of standards issued pursuant thereto. In fiscal year 1969, for
example, fewer than 3,000 of the estimated 75,000 companies affected
by WNalsh-Healey were inspected for job safety and health conditions.
These inspections resulted in only 34 formal complaints and only 32
formal hearings.7" Although the Walsh-Healey Act provides for
"blacklisting" violators for up to three years,80 this sanction was applied
to only two of the over 33,000 violations found in fiscal year 1969.1
In fiscal year 1968, 1,570 firms were inspected, resulting in only 28
complaints issued and three firms "blacklisted." 82 This paucity of en-
forcement suggests that standards promulgated under the Walsh-Healey
Act have been of little interest or concern even to those directly affected
by them. The wholesale promotion of such standards to a position of
vastly more pervasive effect can hardly be justified on a theory that
they had been rigorously tested in the crucible of experience.
One of the earliest cases under the Occupational Safety and Health
Act of 1970 involving a standard initially promulgated under the
WValsh-Healey Act83 was Secretary v. Mountain States Telephone &
Telegraph Co."- The contested standard required that employers "be
responsible for the safe conditions of tools and equipment used by
employees, including tools and equipment which may be furnished by
employees." "I Attempted enforcement of this standard by the Depart-
ment of Labor was disallowed, the Review Commission commenting:
Congress did not enact the Occupational Safety and Health Act
to create guarantors upon whom to fasten responsibility for ill-
79. J. PAGE & M. O'BumrN, BITTER WAGES 100 (1973).
80. 41 U.S.C. § 37 (1970) provides:
The Comptroller General is authorized and directed to distribute a list to
all agencies of the United States containing the names of persons or firms
found by the Secretary of Labor to have breached any of the agreements
or representations required by sections 35-45 of. this title. Unless the Secre-
tary of Labor otherwise recommends no contracts shall be awarded to
such persons or firms or to any firm, corporation, partnership, or associa-
tion in which such persons or firms have a controlling interest until three
years have elapsed from the date the Secretary of Labor determines such
breach to have occurred.
81. J. PAGE & M. O'Bam, supra note 79, at 100.
82. Id.
83. 41 C.F.R. § 50-204.4 (1973).
84. OSAHRC Docket No. 355 (Jan. 3, 1973).
85. 29 C.F.R. § 1910.242(a) (1973).
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nesses or injuries or deaths to employees. Their purpose was
remedial. The Act is a broad scale effort to prevent "personal
injuries and illnesses arising out of work situations." The first-
stated purpose of the Act is to encourage and stimulate "programs
for providing safe and healthful working conditions...." 0
The Commission concluded that the cited employer, one of whose
employees had been electrocuted while using a power tool, could not
be held for a violation since the standard failed to inform the employer
of the action he should take to avoid the occurrence. The language
employed by the standard may be good advice, but its helpfulness in
implementing the purposes of the Act remains doubtful.
Another OSHA standard adopted verbatim from one promulgated
under Walsh-Healey.8 states:
Protective equipment, including personal protective equipment for
eyes, face, head, and extremities, protective clothing, respiratory
devices, and protective shields and barriers, shall be provided,
used, and maintained in a sanitary and reliable condition wherever
it is necessary by reason of hazards of processes or environment,
chemical hazards, radiological hazards, or mechanical irritants
encountered in a manner capable of causing injury or impairment
in the function of any part of the body through absorption, inhala-
tion or physical contact.88
The vague constituent parts of this standard coalesce into a masterpiece
of indefiniteness. The concept "protective equipment" might include
everything from sunglasses and flowered parasols for protection from the
sun to case-hardened steel capsules with self-contained individual life
support systems. "Hazards of processes or environment" excludes even
less, covering at least everything under the sun. It might even include
the sun itself, since there are indications that skin cancer may be more
prevalent among individuals such as farmers, merchant seamen, and
lifeguards who are exposed to the sun's rays for prolonged periods.
This expansive interpretation is not greatly exaggerated, for the
standard already has been employed to cite a variety of hazards" and
86. OSAHRC Docket No. 355, at 3 (footnotes omitted).
87. 41 C.F.R. § 50-204.7 (1973).
88. 29 C.F.R. § 1910.132(a) (1973).
89. Secretary v. Nibco of Colo. Div., OSAHRC Docket No. 302 (pending) (muriatic
acid); Secretary v. Smoke-Craft, Inc, OSAHRC Docket No. 995 (pending) (recipro-
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required protective equipment ° in enforcement actions by the Depart-
ment of Labor. Although the enforceability of this standard has not yet
been determined as a matter of law,91 it clearly fails to implement satisfac-
torily the Act's underlying purpose of improving the safety and health of
workers. That purpose can be achieved only through promulgation of
specific guidelines which set forth fully and clearly what experience and
research have shown to be necessary to maintain safe and healthful
workplaces. If the steps necessary to avoid hazards are not clearly
delineated in the appropriate OSHA standard, even the most sincere,
dedicated, and safety-minded employers may fail to provide safe and
healthful employment conditions.
Many other regulations adopted under the Act from established
federal standards set forth neither the practices required for safety nor
the conditions requiring such practices. Such standards not only are
ineffective in fulfilling their underlying purpose of increasing work-
place safety but also present problems of enforcement similar to those
cating saws); Secretary v. New Bedford Gas & Edison Light Co, OSAHRC Docket
No. 1186 (pending) (electrical power lines); Secretary v. Modem Automotive Serv.,
Inc., OSAHRC Docket No. 1541 (Feb. 27, 1974) (auto parts); Secretary v. Sun
Shipbldg. & Drydock Co., OSAHRC Docket No. 161 (Oct. 3, 1973) (Rust-Ban 191,
a water soluble paint); Secretary v. Ryder Truck Lines, Inc, OSAHRC Docket No.
391 (Aug. 16, 1973), appeal docketed, No. 73-3341, 5th Cir., Oct. 4, 1973 (boxes of
cargo; wheels on freight handling equipment); Secretary v. Imco Container Corp.,
OSAHRC Docket No. 79 (July 31, 1973) (Stoddard solution); Secretary v. Grayson
Lumber Co., OSAHRC Docket No. 793 (June 14, 1973) (cut lumber); Secretary v.
Ira Holliday Logging, Inc., OSAHRC Docket No. 237 (Apr. 27, 1973) (logs);
Secretary v. Young & Morgan, Inc., OSAHRC Docket No. 1085 (Jan. 26, 1973) (logs);
Secretary v. Mack Trucks, Inc, OSAHRC Docket No. 134 (Oct. 10, 1972) (pinion
gears); Secretary v. Spencer Foods, Inc., OSAHRC Docket No. 450 (Sept. 12, 1972)
(slaughterhouse eviscerators' knives); Secretary v. Glass Containers Corp, OSAHRC
Docket No. 555 (Aug. 18, 1972) (ash).
90. E.g., Secretary v. Nibco of Colo. Div., OSAHRC Docket No. 302 (pending)
(rubber aprons); Secretary v. Dravo Corp, OSAHRC Docket No. 1487 (pending)
(ordinary industrial coveralls); Secretary v. Sun Shipbldg. & Drydock Co., OSAHRC
Docket No. 161 (Oct. 3, 1973) (rubber gloves); Secretary v. Ryder Truck Lines, Inc,
OSAHRC Docket No. 391 (Aug. 16, 1973), appeal docketed, No. 73-3341, 5th Cir.,
Oct. 4, 1973 (safety shoes); Secretary v. Grayson Lumber Co., OSAHRC Docket
No. 793 (June 14, 1973) (safety shoes); Secretary v. Ira Holliday Logging, Inc.,
OSAHRC Docket No. 237 (Apr. 27, 1973) (hard hats); Secretary v. Young & Morgan,
Inc., OSAHRC Docket No. 1085 (Jan. 26, 1973) (spiked loggers "caulk" boots);
Secretary v. Spencer Foods, Inc, OSAHRC Docket No. 450 (Sept. 12, 1972) (steel
mesh gloves); Secretary v. Glass Containers Corp, OSAHRC Docket No. 555 (Aug. 18,
1972) (a counter-weight door).
91. The enforceability of this standard is being challenged in Ryder Truck Lines, Inc.
v. OSAHRC, No. 73-3341 (5th Cir., filed Oct. 4, 1973).
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found in applying many of the national consensus standards. The argu-
ments are obvious that many of the established federal standards fail to
provide a fair warning of the conduct required or prohibited and are
subject to arbitrary application by enforcement officials. 2
A recent decision of the Occupational Safety and Health Review
Commission 3 accepted similar arguments in invalidating a job safety
standard providing for employee medical services 4 and adopted ver-
batim from Walsh-Healey regulations. 5 The standard provided that
"[i]n the absence of an infirmary, clinic, or hospital in near proximity
to the workplace.., a person.., shall be adequately trained to render
first aid." 96 In a prior case the Commission had indicated that a standard
would not be declared unenforceably vague, although written in broad
terms, so long as employers of common intelligence and experience
were apprised of the conduct required of them and were not required
to speculate with respect to the meaning of the regulation. 7 In con-
sidering the medical services standard, however, the Commission ruled
that it was "unlimited in spectrum, unlimited in scope and applica-
don .... ." 98 Relying upon evidence in the record that the interpretation
of "near proximity" varied from one safety inspector to another, the
Commission concluded that a standard which could be "applied at the
whim of local [OSHA] area directors"99 cannot be enforced.
CONCLUSION
The national consensus and existing federal standards should have
provided a foundation for effective job safety improvement under the
1970 Act. Uncritical adoption of such standards by OSHA in its initial
promulgations, however, only weakened the effectiveness of the Act.
Blame for such misuse of prior standards could be widely distributed,
but pinpointing the causes is now only an academic exercise contribu-
92. Secretary v. Fulton Instrument Co., OSAHRC Docket No. 563 (pending);
Secretary v. A. Friederich & Sons, OSAHRC Docket No. 344 (pending); Secretary v.
Santa Fe Trail Transport Co., OSAHRC Docket No. 331 (Dec. 18, 1973); Secretary v.
Imes Container Corp, OSAHRC Docket No. 79 (July 31, 1973); Secretary v. Tilo Co,
OSAHRC Docket No. 211 (April 27, 1973); Secretary v. Diesel Constr. Co., OSAHRC
Docket No. 827 (Feb. 20, 1973).
93. Secretary v. Santa Fe Trail Transport Co., OSAHRC Docket No. 331 (Dec. 18,
1973).
94. 29 C.F.R. § 1910.151(b) (1973).
95. 41 C.F.R. 5 50-204.6 (1973).
96. 29 C.F.R. § 1910.151(b) (1973).
97. Secretary v. Georgia Pacific Corp., OSAHRC Docket No. 676 (Aug. 20, 1973).
98. OSAHRC Docket No. 331, at 3-5.
99. ld. at 4.
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ting nothing to the solution of the current problem. The field of occu-
pational safety and health is, after all, no place for blame-laying; nor
is it a place for guessing games, tricky phraseology, or obfuscation. The
job of rewriting existing regulations to include the fundamental elements
of identification of particular hazards and specification of means of
avoiding injury is enormous, for there are literally hundreds of cryptic
and overly broad regulations which must be revised or eliminated. It
w ll require dedicated effort to accomplish this task, but it is essential
that the effort be made. The lives and well-being of people are at stake.
